

Europeanization and Democratization of Parties and Party System of Serbia

The aim of this paper is to determine the existence - and the level of impact - of the process of European integrations, i.e. europeanization, to parties and party system of Serbia. The process of europeanization is closely connected with the process of democratization. According to that, it is necessary to divide the period from 1990 to 2007 into the time of Milošević and the time after him, when admission to the EU became one of the priorities. This paper also treats the changes of party and electoral system in that period and analyses the surveys and research, made after 2000, on the questions of EU integration. Also is mentioned cooperation with the Hague tribunal, as an important factor for the integration as well as the admission of some of the Serbian parties in the European party federations.

The paper is based on the previous researches and used methods, which are focused on the institutionalization of party systems (Mainwaring, 1998), European influence on national party systems (Mair, 2000) and some other fields, influenced by europeanization, policy/programmatic content, organization, patterns of party competition, party-government relation and relation beyond the national party system (Ladreach, 2002), role of europarties (Zsolt Enyedi and Paul G. Lewis, 2006), as well as concrete case studies and comparisons (Fink-Hafner and Krašovec, 2005; Fink-Hafner, 2007). The problem is represented by the fact that Serbia is in the initial phase of the process of admission to the EU and therefore the mentioned models cannot be used in their totality.

Europeanization and democratization

When speaking about Serbia, there is a direct interdependence between democratization and europeanization processes. They both require respect of defined standards and realization of defined criteria. These processes are, therefore, complementary. It is not rare that democracy is understood as harmonization with the EU standards. States applying for the EU membership, depending on their status and phase in that process, are

supervised and monitored by the EU. In these processes, Serbia has certain similarities with other post-communist societies of this region, but also some significant differences. While on one hand integrative europeanization processes are underway, the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia is entering its final phase (Montenegro in 2006, Kosovo waiting for a new status in 2007). 1990s were the most difficult period for Serbia: wars for legacy of the SFRY, foreign-political isolation and the UN sanctions, NATO bombing campaign, Milošević's authoritarianism. That was an anti-European and out-of-European way. After the political changes of 2000, improvement of relations with the EU and admission to its membership became the priorities for the new Serbian government.

When similarities with other post-communist states are concerned, Serbia did not passed by the process in which the collapse of communism had an epilogue in dissolution of communist federations (USSR, CSR and SFRY) along national-federal seams. Implosion of communism was simultaneously followed by explosion of nationalism (V. Pavlović). During the 1990s, political competition was reduced to the conflict between the nationalists and the westerners. Nationalism always potentially bears or reproduces anti-Western sentiments. Ever since the introduction of multiparty system, nationalists have been showing an “unreachable advantage on elections” (Pavlović, 2004: 184).

Serbia during the 1990s and after 2000

Political life in Serbia during the 1990s had characteristics of a closed state (by sanctions), closed society (by prohibitions) and closed system (by blockades), with fair political competition neither even being allowed nor possible. Milošević and his SPS only on the first multiparty elections in 1990 won majority of votes and had a single-party government, but all the time until 2000 they were on power with assistance of other parties in coalition governments.¹

¹ On the first multiparty elections in 1990 there was a majoritarian electoral system (two-round). SPS won 46% of votes which, thanking to the electoral system, brought it 77.6% of mandates, i.e. 194 out of 250 seats in the Assembly of Serbia. That was a single-party government. On the next elections in 1992 a proportional electoral system was introduced, with nine electoral districts. SPS won 28.8% of votes and 40.4% of seats in the Parliament (101 out of 250). This government lasted for 9 months. On elections in 1993 (proportional electoral system, nine electoral districts), SPS won 36.7% of votes and 42.2 seats (123

During 2000, under external and internal pressures and with assistance of the civil society, democratic opposition parties united in the DOS (Democratic Opposition of Serbia).² DOS was united around the idea against Milošević and on the principle of a civic European orientation. An agreement was reached for the President of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) to be the presidential candidate of this coalition on elections for the President of Yugoslavia, and President of the Democratic Party (DS) to be the future Republic Prime Minister.³ Milošević lost the presidential elections, but he had to be defeated twice, once on the elections and for the second time, defending the election victory by demonstrations and street rallies. After the political changes of 2000, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has been integrated into international institutions and organizations in a very short time.⁴

DOS won the elections for the Assembly of Serbia on December 24th, 2000 (proportional electoral system, Serbia was a single electoral district), by winning a two-third majority

out of 250), Socialists needed three seats for majority, and they formed the government with assistance of the “opposition” New Democracy, which won six deputies’ seats on the list of the DEPOS Coalition, which consisted of Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), New Democracy (ND) and Civic Alliance of Serbia (GSS). On elections in 1997 (proportional electoral system and 29 electoral districts), Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS)-Yugoslav Left (JUL)-ND won 34.25% of votes and 44% of seats (110 out of 250). A coalition government was formed of SPS, JUL and Serbian Radical Party (SRS), so called “red-black coalition”, but on insisting of the radicals, without the ND.

² DOS – Democratic Opposition of Serbia, which was created by uniting 18 political parties in the beginning of 2000, although not all the members were (classical) parties, as follows: Democratic Party (DS), Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), Social-democracy (SD), Civic Alliance of Serbia (GSS), Democratic Christian Party of Serbia (DHSS), New Serbia (NS), Movement for Democratic Serbia (PDS), Social-Democratic League of Vojvodina (LSV), Reformist Democratic Party of Vojvodina (RDSV), Alliance of Hungarians from Vojvodina (SVM), Vojvodina Coalition (KV), Democratic Alternative (DA), Democratic Centre (DC), New Democracy (ND), Social-democratic Union (SDU), Sandžak Democratic Party (SDP), League for Šumadija (LZS), Serbian Resistance Movement – Democratic Movement (SPO-DM) and Association of Free and Independent Unions.

³ On presidential elections on September 24th, 2000 the DOS candidate defeated Milošević, and that was V. Koštunica who won 50.24% of votes – 2,470,304 versus 37.15% - 1,826,799 votes for Milošević. DOS won also the elections for federal Parliament by winning 42.9% of votes and 53.7% of mandates versus 32.25% of votes and 40.7% of seats of the SPS.

⁴ First, on October 26, 2000 it was admitted in the Stability Pact for the South-East Europe, on November 1 in the United Nations, on November 10 the membership in OSCE was renewed, on November 17 it resumed diplomatic relations with the USA, Germany, France and Great Britain, on December 20 it became a member of the International Monetary Fund, and in April 2003 a member of the Council of Europe.

of mandates.⁵ The government of the Prime Minister Zoran Djindjić (DS President at the time), formed after these elections, was a coalition government, and the first democratic government, and its composition represented the combination of political and expert government.⁶ This government was extremely pro-European and reformative.

The political changes of 2000 have not removed all pillars of Milošević's regime, and on March 12th, 2003 forces of the old regime which survived in the structure of secret services assassinated the Prime Minister of Serbia, Zoran Djindjić. Linked with this assassination is also the anti-Hague lobby, which criticized Djindjić for arresting and extradition of Slobodan Milošević to the Hague Tribunal on June 28th (2001) carried out by his government. The assassination of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Serbia Zoran Djindjić was a huge loss for democratic Serbia and a step backwards in democratization, reforms and europeanization of Serbia. Zoran Živković from the DS was appointed a new Prime Minister. These events have left consequences on cooperation with the Hague Tribunal, bearing the threat of destabilization of Serbia.

After the elections in 2003, a minority government was formed, composed from the coalition of DSS, G 17 Plus, SPO-NS with totally 109 out of 250 deputies with support of the SPS (plus 22 deputies), which represent 131 out of 250 seats.⁷ V. Koštunica, the President of the DSS, became the Prime Minister. As V. Goati points out referring to this Government: "The programme of the Government of Serbia is, in its most important items, located in the middle of a linear continuum of pro-European/traditional: on the extreme points of the continuum, there are two opposition parties: DS and SRS..." (Goati, 2006: 73).

⁵ On these elections DOS won 64.4% of votes and 70.4% of seats in the Parliament – a two-third majority (176 of 250). In only two months, from September 24 to December 23, SPS lost 1,016,996 votes (from elections for the Federal Parliament 1,532,841 votes to 515,845 votes on the elections for the Assembly of Serbia).

⁶ The President (DS) and seven Vice-Presidents were the DOS party leaders (DSS, DA, ND, PDS, SD, SDU and SVM). Leaders of some parties - coalition members were "only" Ministers (Vojvodina Coalition, DHSS, GSS) and remaining members of the Government composed its expert part, in charge for finance, energetics, privatization and foreign economic relations.

⁷ On elections for the Assembly of Serbia held on December 28, 2003 (proportional electoral system, single electoral district, turnout of 57.72% or 3,748,623 (of 6,493,672 registered voters) SRS won 82 seats, DSS-53, DS-37, G17 Plus-34, SPO-NS-22, SPS-22.

Serbian party system

Changes of the state frames (borders) (SFRY, FRY, Serbia and Montenegro, Serbia) changed also the framework and nature of party competition. We shall consider the party system, “the network of competitive relationships between political parties” (Rae, 1967: 47), through influences of institutional elements and social structures, first of all of social cleavages.

The party system in Serbia changed in the time frame 1990-2007, and this was primarily a consequence of the results of the seven parliamentary elections called in the period: 1990, 1992, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2003 and 2007. An important trait of all these elections is that there were major oscillations in the strength of all parties, which is an indicator of weakness of both parties and party system. One could quantify these oscillations in the “total electoral volatility”, which means the percentage of votes, which “went from one party to the other” as compared with the previous elections. One gets these data by adding all positive and negative differences in the percentage of votes given to parliamentary parties, as compared with previous elections. Diachronically, the data on the difference in the percentage of votes given to Serbian parliamentary parties are as follows: 1992- 48,1; 1993- 24,4; 1997- 26,2; 2000-110; 2003-41,5, and 2007- 18,84 where the “average total electoral instability’ is 44,84. This high fluctuation of the achievement of parties in elections is not typical for the other countries in the process of transition.

Electoral system

Since the introduction of multiparty system in 1990, electoral system in Serbia was changed several times. The major change of the electoral system was carried out in 1992, with transition from majoritarian to proportional electoral system. The other change dealt with the number of electoral districts: on elections in 1992 and 1993 in Serbia there were nine electoral districts: on elections in 1992 in Serbia there were 29 electoral districts:

and on elections in 2000 and 2003 Serbia was a single electoral district. All the time the census was 5%. The last change of the electoral system came after the elections of 2003, when the census was abolished for parties of national minorities. All the time, d'Hondt's formula for converting votes into mandates has been used. In Serbia, the 1990 Constitution introduced a semi-presidential system, which is retained also in the new 2006 Constitution.

Social cleavages

When it comes to social structure, in Serbia there is a particularly deep historical-ethnic cleavage (national-civic). This cleavage largely marks the political scene of Serbia and slows down democratization and europeanization processes. Slavujević reminds us that the "horizontal" line of historical-ethnic cleavage is supplemented by the "vertical" dimension. This is about the cleavage between nationalist and civic orientation among representatives of each ethnic group (Slavujević, 2003: 96). Besides, empirical findings show that the axis of the "national-civic" historical-ethnic cleavage and the axis of "traditionalism-modernism" cultural-value cleavage do not intersect, but largely overlap, with "national" coinciding with "traditionalism" and "civic" with "modernism" (Slavujević, 2003: 98). In Slavujević's opinion, this leads to a conclusion of synergic effects of these two axes of divisions to party grouping.

Parties and party system of Serbia are not institutionalized (Mainwaring, 1998: 71). During the 1990s, party system of Serbia had characteristics of a party system with a dominant party (SPS) and in period 2000-2006 it had characteristics of a polarized pluralism according to Sartori's criteria (Sartori, 1976: 120-127). Evidence for this is in the following characteristics: first, the existence of "anti-system parties" which do not share values of political order in which they act. After the political changes of October 5, 2000, SRS and SPS did not recognize the results of changes, considering them illegal and illegitimate. Second, the existence of "bilateral opposition", meaning that two opposition parties can be closer to ruling parties than to each other. SRS and DS were closer to parties within the ruling coalition than between themselves. DS is a natural ally of the

DSS (once they were the same party) but when it comes to the national issue, SRS and DSS are closer.

Public opinion of Serbia on European integrations

After a ten-year isolation of the country, integration with the EU enjoys a large support among the citizens of Serbia. Imperatives of integration are in that larger as experiences of the UN sanctions and 'ghetto society' are strong and fresh.

A large percentage of the citizens of Serbia, asked if Serbia should enter the EU, replies with yes - about 72-26%, comparing to 8-13% which say no. The vast majority of supporters, including both the radicals (SRS) and Milošević's socialists (SPS), is in favor of entering the EU.⁸ Since June 2002, the (pro)-European mood of the public opinion of Serbia is checked quarterly or annually. According to these surveys, the idea of the EU is in Serbia, in some sense, a generator of optimism, as it associates the citizens with more quality life, better standard and possibility for traveling.⁹ Besides positive associations, in smaller percentage also present are lack of trust, permanent ultimatums, unjustified policy and too large demands. Although a significant percentage of citizens of Serbia support the idea of accession of Serbia to the EU, it is not clear what it exactly means. The majority sees that entry as benefits and privileges with respect to rise of living standard. The dimension of necessary changes, which have to be realized on the way to adjustment to market economy and rule of law, is neglected. From 2002 to 2006, about 70% of citizens of Serbia would vote "yes" on the referendum on entering the EU. There is an anomaly present. Although 70% of citizens support entry in the EU, significantly smaller number supports extradition of the indicted for war crimes, although it is a condition for negotiations on the Association Agreement.

The EU enjoys larger trust than any other international organization and although only a half trusts it, it is still much higher level of support than to any Serbian national political

⁸ Srbobran Branković, "EU na srpskom politickom jelovniku"/EU on Serbian Political Menu/, Evropski forum, 1; http://www.becei.org/EF_0105/SBrankovic0105.htm

institution.

How would citizens of Serbia vote on referendum on entering the EU

| | I would vote yes (%) | I would vote no (%) | I would not vote (%) |
|--------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| June 02 | 67 | 9 | 14 |
| September 02 | 68 | 13 | 10 |
| December 02 | 70 | 8 | 13 |
| March 03 | 76 | 6 | 12 |
| December 03 | 72 | 8 | 12 |
| June 04 | 72 | 7 | 12 |
| September 04 | 71 | 12 | 17 |
| September 05 | 64 | 12 | 16 |
| September 06 | 69.9 | 12.3 | 17.8 |

Source: SMMRI 2002-2006, Survey carried out for needs of the Serbian Government's EU Integration Office¹⁰

In the last survey (SMMRI September 2006) when citizens were requested to name a political person who contributes the approaching to the EU the most, two thirds of citizens named Boris Tadić (President of Serbia and President of the DS), and one-third Vojislav Koštunica (at that moment Prime Minister of Serbia and President of the DSS). Two more persons are recognized as significant: Mladjan Dinkić (Minister of Finance and President of G17 Plus) and Vuk Drašković (Minister of Foreign Affairs and President of the SPO). When it is about a political party, more than a half (52%) of votes goes to the DS, followed by the DSS (19%), G17 Plus (13%), and 6% of disappointed citizens claiming that there is no such party. These results are also in accordance to the parliamentary elections' results, because DS, DSS and G17 plus obtained the majority of votes and formed the new government.

Srbobran Branković, director of the Medium Gallup from Belgrade, breaks down the picture of citizens of Serbia about the EU, asking the interviewees to reply the question which of four possible attitudes regarding Europe the most corresponds with their own. Where:

1. *Euroenthusiasts* are the ones who say: "Europe is very close to me and I think that we

⁹ Survey carried out by the SMMRI Group (Strategic Marketing and Media Research Institute Group) for needs of the EU Integration Office of the Government of Serbia.

¹⁰ http://www.becei.org/evropski%20forumi%20u%20pdf-u/Evropski_forum_1-2_2005.pdf

have to do everything we can to become its member, which includes fulfillment of all conditions it sets". 22% of interviewees share this attitude.

2. *Eurorealists*, who say: "I cannot say that Europe is particularly close to me, but I think that the integration in the EU is necessary and that we have to work on it". 35% of interviewees share this attitude.

3. *Eurosceptics*, who say: "I suspect the intentions of Europe and the West in general and I think that we have to enter in its structures very cautiously and slowly". 29% of interviewees share this attitude.

4. *Eurofobs*, who say: "Integration with Europe would mean domination of European and other forces above our people; Serbia does not belong to that world and therefore we should maintain our traditional values and not allow us to enter that furious race". 13% of interviewees share this attitude.

When these offered types compare with support to parties, we get that the supporters of G17 Plus and the DS (of the President Tadić) are the most devoted pro-Europeans. Supporters of G17 Plus are 44% euroenthusiasts and 42% eurorealists; similar is among supporters of the DS out of whom 37% are euroenthusiasts and 42% eurorealists. Supporters of the DSS (Koštunica) are 51% eurorealists, 24% eurosceptics and 17% euroenthusiasts. Movement "Power of Serbia" (PSS) of Bogoljub Karić had an unexpected number of euroenthusiasts, 20%. The largest number of PSS supporters is of eurorealists - 41% and eurofobs - 31%. Supporters of Milošević's SPS are the most anti-European. Among them there are no euroenthusiasts - 47% are eurosceptics, 41% eurofobs and 12% eurorealists.¹¹

According to the research of the Medium Gallup Belgrade, in August 2004, party affiliation and determination for accession to the EU are as follows: DS 93% yes, 1% no; G17 Plus 87% yes, 9% no; DSS 86% yes 4% no; PSS 62% yes 16% no; SRS 66% yes, 23% no; SPS 67% yes 25% no; unaffiliated 69% yes 9% no; and apstinents 63% yes 10%

¹¹ On this see also: Judy Batt, *Sveske iz Sajoa, No. 81, August 2005, Pitanje Srbije*, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence, 2005, p. 61 /*Challot paper no. 81, August 2005, The Question of Serbia*, EU Institute for Security Studies 2005

no.¹²

Similar to this, according to the research of the Centre for Free Elections and Democracy (CESID)¹³ in favour of the entry to the EU is 97% of supporters of the DS, 93% of supporters of small parties, 93% of supporters of PSS, 87% of the DSS. On the other hand, the smallest number of advocates of the European orientation is among the supporters of the SPS - 49% and SRS - 52%. When we count the relation toward democracy without those who did not reply to this question (23% in total sample, and among those without party affiliation as much as 37%), than we see "more clear" relations toward democracy. Concretely, prodemocratic attitudes everywhere have more than a half majority, except among socialists (SPS) and radicals (SRS). Prodemocratic attitudes are the most frequent among the supporters of the DS (85%), DSS (74%), small parties (69%), PSS (68%), and the rarest among those without party affiliation (49%), SRS (30%) and SPS (only 18%). The claim: "In some cases, an undemocratic government can be better than a democratic one", is the most frequently accepted by supporters of the SPS (66%) and SRS (44%).

View into results of public opinion in Serbia leads to a conclusion - while Milošević's Serbia during 1990s kept distancing from Europe, post-Milošević Serbia after 2000 sees that returning to Europe is the only way (3/4 of citizens).

EU Negotiations and Cooperation with the Hague Tribunal

Serbia entered the European integration processes within an arrangement of the state union of Serbia and Montenegro.¹⁴ In October 2004, the EU offered the "dual track" principle. Serbia and Montenegro had a single market, but two currencies, as in the

¹² Medium Gallup Beograd, http://www.becei.org/evropski%20formi%20u%20pdf-u/Evropski_forum_1-2_2005.pdf

¹³ "Izgradnja proevropske demokratske kulture kroz jačanje kapaciteta kreatora javnog mnjenja" / "Building of pro-European democratic culture through enforcement of capacities of public opinion creators" / spring 2005, Političke podele u Srbiji – pet godina posle, Srećko Mihailović et. all / *Political divisions in Serbia – five years after*, <http://www.cesid.org/programi/istrazivanja/index.jsp>

¹⁴ On the Referendum in May 2006 Montenegro chose independence

beginning of 2002 Montenegro accepted Euro. "Dual track" meant that the two republics were negotiating separately with the EU about economic issues, which make about 80% of the content of the Stabilization and Association Agreement, but would be treated as a single state when talking about political criteria (democracy, rule of law and minority rights, harmonization of the foreign policy with the EU). There was an important political condition for getting the Feasibility Study. In spite of problems in functioning of otherwise infunctional common state of Serbia and Montenegro, slow progress in the association process was more caused by another reason. Serbia was requested to demonstrate a satisfactory level of cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Through the principle of "voluntary surrender", in January and February 2005, many of the indicted for war crimes arrived in The Hague (although the main indicted, Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić, remained on freedom). Twelve indicted for war crimes voluntarily surrendered to the Tribunal, finances assets of the Hague fugitives were frozen and good cooperation was established between the Hague Tribunal Prosecutor's Office and the Special Court for War Crimes in Serbia. With guarantees from the Government of Serbia, several indicted were released to freedom till the beginning of trial.¹⁵ The resumed cooperation with the Hague Tribunal since the beginning of 2005 was enough for providing commencement of association negotiations and on April 2005 a positive EU Feasibility Study was obtained, recommending opening of negotiations on stabilization and association with Serbia and Montenegro. The negotiations commenced on November 7, 2005 and were suspended in June 2006, also due to lack of cooperation with The Hague. The cooperation with the Hague Tribunal holds Serbia in the "trap of an unfinished past". The Hague's pressures and requirements and the experience of the NATO intervention are used by extreme nationalists (and by anti-Hague lobby) to exploit anti-Western and anti-democratic potentials, as these were linked to the bombing of Serbia (1999). The Government with the Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica (President of the DSS) is meritorious for starting the negotiations on association with the EU, but is responsible for suspension of the negotiations. The negotiations between Serbia and the EU are continued on June 13,

¹⁵ In December 2004, Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović, and then in 2005 also Vladimir Lazarević, Milan Milutinović, Nikola Šainović and Dragoljub Ojdanić.

2007, but completing cooperation with The Hague is necessary to conclude the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA).

Members of European party federations (Europarties)

Since recently, some parties in Serbia became members of European party federations (Europarties). Of relevant parties, DS has been admitted in the Party of European Socialists (PES), a federation of social-democratic, socialist and labourist EU parties in the status of observer (December 2006). DSS and G17 Plus have been received in the European People's Party (EPP), a federation of conservative, Christian-democratic and people's EU parties in the status of associated member (June 2005). This type of membership does not entirely correspond to programme contents of these parties or the way they are perceived by the electoral body (Goati, 2006: 48). New relations with European party federations (Europarties) bring them in a privileged position in relation to rival parties in their countries from the aspect of obtaining European legitimacy and increase of possibilities for further lobbying. But first of all, as a signal of recognition of forces which bear and share European values and beliefs. For parties in Serbia, Europarties can represent crucial mechanisms of programme and value standardization (Lewis – Mansfeldova, 2006: 263). Their important role is explaining the importance and necessity for carrying out the reforms in a society that pretends to the EU membership of the Union, aimed at overlapping of democratization and europeanization.

Besides parties' belonging to supranational federations, typology of party families is founded also on genesis from social conflicts and political orientation of parties (Beyme). When party programmes are concerned, certain changes in some parties are coming in sight. The impact of membership in the Socialist International (and later also in PES) can most be felt in the case of the Democratic Party (DS). It started to move toward transformation from the position of the "civic centre" to social-democratic orientation. DS defined itself as a "modern party of the civic centre" (Electoral Programme of the DS, 1992). The Programme of 1997 offers a more developed definition of the DS as a party of the centre, in the Programme of May 2001 the Party deideologises its position, while in

the Programme adopted in October 2001 ideological positioning of the party is completely abandoned. With admission in the Socialist International, the Party turns toward social-democratization (Electoral Programme of 2007). Although some parties have not changed their formal programmes, pro-European rhetoric is far more present in public appearances.

DSS more clearly moved toward groupation of people's parties. It might be characterized as a conservative-national DSS. With G17 Plus and LDP we feel closeness to liberal party family. DSS, SPO, NS and PSS-BK are closer to conservative party family.

Elections 2007

After the adoption of the Constitution of Serbia¹⁶, parliamentary elections in Serbia were called for January 21st, 2007. On these elections, twenty electoral lists were submitted, with about thirty parties participating in them. Among the submitted lists, there were six minority and seven coalition lists. Electoral campaign was largely marked by European topics. There was less nationalist rhetoric while economic-social issues were the most present. During the electoral campaign, many signals arrived from the EU confirming that Serbia has political and economic capacities for joining and that, with cooperation with The Hague, the door of European integrations can be more widely open. This is confirmed by postponing of presentation of the proposal for solution of the final status of Kosovo and Metohia, commencement of visa facilitation negotiations, admission in the Partnership for Peace¹⁷ and admission of the DS in the PES. Results of the elections¹⁸ can

¹⁶ The new Constitution of Serbia was adopted on October 28th-29th, 2006 on the Referendum and proclaimed on November 8th, 2006 in the Assembly

¹⁷ "The Partnership for Peace programme is the most important institution of the NATO oriented toward enforcement of trust and cooperation among member-states of the NATO and other countries in the Euro-Atlantic region, aimed at development and strengthening of stability and security in Europe. Although the main task of the Partnership for Peace is cooperation in the field of defense, the character of the programme is primarily political and it is a very important factor in the security architecture of Europe" (p. 393), *Četiri godine tranzicije u Srbiji /Four years of the transition in Serbia*, Begović Boris and Djilas Milica (2005), *Međunarodni odnosi /International Relations/*, in *Četiri godine tranzicije u Srbiji*, group of authors, Centre for Liberal-Democratic Studies, Belgrade

¹⁸ Election results 2007: SRS-81, DS-64, DSS-NS-47, G17 Plus-19, SPS-16, LDP-GSS-SDU-LSDV-15, SVM-3, List for Sandzak-2, Roma Union of Serbia-1, Coalition of Albanians from the Presevo valley -1, Roma Party-1

be interpreted in different ways. On one hand, it can be said that the parties which participated together in political changes of 2000 (pro-democratic and pro-European block) won a two-third majority. On the other hand, the anti-European SRS is individually the biggest party, with 81 mandates. After three-month coalitional negotiations the government is formed by DS (64)+ DSS-NS (47)+ G17 (19) =130 from 250 MP's, reflecting the will of voters, formation of a majoritarian, democratic and pro-European government. Two the biggest challenges for this government are the cooperation with the Hague Tribunal, and unsolved status of Kosovo.

Conclusion

The role of parties is to bridge political and cultural gap and remove obstacles standing on the European way. It is sometimes in discrepancy with electoral calculation, as it requires also some unpopular actions, such is the cooperation with The Hague. Considering that political changes in Serbia occurred some ten years later, europeanization of parties and party system is of smaller volume when compared with other countries in the region. During the 1990s, the dominant was the competition of Milošević's SPS and opposition on relation 'isolation nationalism – European modernism'. After the political changes of 2000, parties in Serbia do not have that many dilemmas about the European way as there are issues of dynamics and removal of obstacles standing on that way. The Hague Tribunal and the status of Kosovo are the biggest among them. Parties in Serbia disagree about these issues. When it is about programmes, the influence of the EU is obvious (DS and G17 Plus). In the field of party organization, we observe innovations related to introduction of international cooperation bodies with the DS, SPO and GSS. Influence of the Europarties is in sight, but parties in Serbia have been admitted to these party federations only recently. Serbia is still not a candidate for accession to the EU, which might have influenced that overall impact of europeanization of parties and party system is moderate.

Europeanization of Parties and Party System of Serbia

The basic argument outlined in this paper is that in order to understand the impact of European integration on national parties and party system, we have to find out how the majority of parties is adjusted in their programs, platforms and public statements. There is a relationship between process of democratization and Europeanization. It is necessary to divide the period from 1990 to 2007 into the time of Milošević and the time after him. Political life in Serbia during the 1990s had characteristics of a closed state, closed society and closed system. During 2000, under external and internal pressures and with assistance of the civil society, democratic opposition parties united in the DOS, around the idea against Milošević and on the principle of a civic European orientation. After the political changes of 2000, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has been integrated into international institutions and organizations in a very short time. The party system in Serbia changed in the time frame 1990-2007, and this was primarily a consequence of the results of the seven parliamentary elections called in the period 1990-2007. An important trait of all these elections is that there were major oscillations in the strength of all parties. Also, the electoral system was changed several times. The major change was carried out in 1992, with transition from majoritarian to proportional electoral system. The last change of the electoral system came after the elections of 2003, when the census was abolished for parties of national minorities. After a ten-year isolation of the country, integration with the EU enjoys a large support among the citizens of Serbia. Although a significant percentage of citizens of Serbia support the idea of accession of Serbia to the EU, but the necessary changes are often neglected. The negotiations between Serbia and the EU are continued on June 13, 2007. Some Serbian parties have become members of European party federations (families). Parliamentary elections were held on January, 21st 2007. The government is formed by DS, DSS-NS and G17, as a majoritarian, democratic and pro-European government. Two the biggest challenges for this government are the cooperation with the Hague Tribunal, and unsolved status of Kosovo.

Key words: Europeanization, political parties, party system, europarties

ABBREVIATIONS:

| | |
|------|---------------------------------------|
| DOS | Democratic Opposition of Serbia |
| DS | Democratic Party |
| DSS | Democratic Party of Serbia |
| G17 | G17 Plus |
| SPO | Serbian Renewal Movement |
| SPS | Socialist Party of Serbia |
| SRS | Serbian Radical Party |
| PSS | Movement „Power of Serbia“ |
| NS | New Serbia |
| SDP | Social Democratic Party |
| LDP | Liberal Democratic Party |
| SSJ | Party of Serbian Unity |
| DHSS | Christian Democratic Party of Serbia |
| SVM | Alliance of Hungarians from Vojvodina |
| GSS | Civic Alliance of Serbia |

LSV League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina
JUL Yugoslav Left
ND New Democracy

LITERATURE:

Batt Judy, (2005), *Sveske iz Šajoa, br. 81. Avgust 2005. Pitanje Srbije*, Institut za studije bezbednosti Evropska unija, Pariz, Beogradski fond za političku izuzetnost, 2005., p. 61. (*Challot paper no. 81, Avgust 2005, The Question of Serbia*, EU Institute for Security Studies 2005.)

Begović Boris and Djilas Milica, (2005), *Medjunarodni odnosi*, in *Četiri godine tranzicije u Srbiji./International Relations*, in *Four Years of Transition in Serbia/*, group of authors, Centre for Liberal-Democratic Studies, Belgrade

Enyedy Zsolt and Paul G Lewis, *The Impact of the European Union on Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe* in: Lewis Paul G., Zdenka Mansfeldova (ED.), *The European Union and Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.

Fink-Hafner Danica and Alenka Krašovec, (2005), *Europeanisation of the Slovenian party system – from marginal European impacts to the domestication of EU policy issues?* *Politics in Central Europe* 2 (June, 2006)

Fink-Hafner Danica, *Europeanization of Parties and Party systems in the Western Balkans* (draft)

Goati Vladimir, (2006), *Partijske borbe u Srbiji u postoktobarskom razdoblju, /Party struggles in Serbia in the period after the October 5/*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade

Lewis Paul G., Zdenka Mansfeldova (ED.), *The European Union and Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.

Mair Peter (2000), *The Limited Impact of Europe on National Party Systems*, *West European Policy*, 8 (6), pp.980-1012

Mainwaring Scott, (1998), *Party Systems in the Third Wave*, *Journal of Democracy*, 3:67-82

Pavlović Vukašin, (2004) *Civilno društvo i demokratija./Civil society and democracy/* Association for Political Sciences of Serbia and Montenegro, Čigoja štampa, Civic Initiatives, Faculty of Political Sciences, Belgrade

Rae Douglas, (1967), *The political Consequencies of Electoral Lows*; New Haven an London: Yale University Press

Sartori Giovanni, (2002), *Stranke i stranački sustavi (Analitički okvir) /Parties and party systems. A Framework for Analysis (1976)*, Political culture, Zagreb

Slavujević Zoran Dj.,(2003), *Mogući pravci pregrupisavanja partijske scene Srbije*, in *Promene vrednosti i tranzicija u Srbiji: pogled u budućnost*, /Possible directions of regrouping of party scene in Serbia, in *Value changes and transition in Serbia*/, Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade and Fridrih Ebert Stiftung

OTHER SOURCES:

Srbobran Branković, „EU na srpskom političkom jelovniku“/EU on Serbian political menu/, Evropski forum, 1; http://www.becei.org/EF_0105/SBrankovic0105.htm

Survey of SMMRI Group (Strategic Marketing and Media Research Insitute Group) for needs of the Serbian Government's EU Integration Office:
<http://www.seio.sr.gov.yu/code/navigate.asp?Id=90>

Evropski forum, No.1-2. January-February, 2005., Vreme, No. 738, 24.02.2005.
http://www.becei.org/evropski%20forumi%20u%20pdf-u/Evropski_forum_1-2_2005.pdf

Medium Gallup Beograd, http://www.becei.org/evropski%20forumi%20u%20pdf-u/Evropski_forum_1-2_2005.pdf

„Izgradnja proevropske demokratske kulture kroz jačanje kapaciteta kreatora javnog mnenja“, spring 2005, Političke podele u Srbiji – pet godina posle./Building of proeuropean democratic culture through strenghtening of capacities of public opinion creators, spring 2005, Political divisions in Serbia – five years after/ Srećko Mihailović et al., <http://www.cesid.org/programi/istrazivanje/index.jsp>

National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia
<http://www.parlament.sr.gov.yu/content/cir/akta/ostalaakta.asp>

Serbian European Integration Office
<http://www.seio.sr.gov.yu/code/navigate.asp?Id=20>

SLAVIŠA ORLOVIĆ, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Political Science, University of Belgrade. *Published Book*: "Političke partije i moc"("Political Parties and Power") *Area of specialization*: Political parties, Elections, Democracy, Parliamentarism
E-mail: slavisa.orlovic@fpn.bg.ac.yu